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ABSTRACT 
 
Iglesias D, García-González L, García-Calvo T, León B, Del Villar F. Expertise development in sport: 
contributions under cognitive psychology perspective. J. Hum. Sport Exerc. Vol. 5, No. 3, pp. 462-475, 
2010. The aim of this paper has been that of revising and updating research about expertise development 
in sport under the cognitive psychology approach. At first, the structure of sport action in open contexts is 
analysed, differentiating cognitive and execution components. Secondly, having as a reference frame 
Anderson’s cognitive theory, it is possible to remark the importance of the process of building knowledge as 
a forerunner variable of ability. Finally, the most relevant and consistent findings about the role of 
knowledge, technical ability and experience are exposed, as well as their inter-relation effect. Departing 
from the current state of this matter, the necessity to propose new studies deepening about this area of 
investigation is suggested, especially about the characterization of practice quality that may contribute to 
the development of sport ability. Key words: EXPERTISE, COGNITION, SPORT. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The level of skill, ability, expertise or performance of human beings when doing sport tasks increase 
significantly as well as the subject acquires experience and accumulates practice (Ericsson, 2003; Côté, 
Baker, & Abernethy, 2003; Hodges, Starkes, & MacMahon, 2006). Therefore, one of the biggest worries of 
researchers is finding how these changes are produced, how a subject evolves from novice to expert, and 
how we can provoke this evolution effectively dealing with systematic training (Côté, Baker, & Abernethy, 
2007; Starkes & Ericsson, 2003; Williams & Hodges, 2004). 
 
Difficulties in expertise development in sport could be explained by means of the Thomas and Thomas 
analysis (1994), who remark two differentiating factors related to other performance areas. These 
researchers point out that the development of skills related to movement mean, in a first place, a 
processing system characterised by a high time pressure activities. This fact is mostly obvious in collective 
or in high strategy sports, where players have to take fast decisions about their action. Secondly, “knowing 
when” and “how” doesn’t mean taking into account a task in a satisfactory way. Tasks such as chess or 
solving a mathematical problem are highly correlated to knowing how to solve it and solving it in a practical 
way. However, in sport, knowing how to solve a playing situation doesn’t mean performing it during real 
game. In other words, a player may have high levels of specific knowledge, but he may also not have any 
expertise on execution skills (Thomas & Thomas, 1994). 
 
Knapp (1963) stated that ability in team sports is determined by technique and by decision making, being 
technique the ability to perform the motor component of an action, and being decision making the 
knowledge needed to choose the right technique according to the particular situation where the playing 
action is developed. Following this line, it is possible to divide the performance during game play, 
differentiating cognitive and skill components (Iglesias, Moreno, Santos-Rosa, Cervelló, & del Villar, 2005). 
Cognitive components include knowledge and decision making, while the skill component is related to 
motor execution. Consequently, the quality in decision making in a game situation is as important as the 
motor skill execution, being both key elements to get sport performance (Thomas & Thomas, 1994; 
Blomqvist, Luhtanen, & Laakso, 2001). 
 
PARADIGM OF KNOWLEDGE. A COGNITIVE APPROACH 
 
At the beginning, the paradigm of knowledge was introduced into the study of human cognitive processes 
(Anderson, 1982; Chi & Rees, 1983) and later, it was adapted to measure expertise in sport (French & 
Thomas, 1987; McPherson & Thomas, 1989). Under the cognitive psychology approach, it is considered 
that decision making is done by means of knowledge structures stored into memory. This approach tries to 
describe in depth the knowledge structures that lie underlying expert performance (Iglesias, Ramos, 
Fuentes, Sanz, & del Villar, 2003). 
 
It is suggested that expert players have a more elaborated and sophisticated knowledge than novice 
players. Experts not only know what to do in a wide variety of situation, but they also know how and when 
to apply this knowledge and they are able to reproduce it in the appropriate situations (Singer & Janelle, 
1999). To support this question some researches analysing differences between experts and novices have 
been developed about cognitive aspects. Results show that experts differ from novices on the quantity and 
on the type of knowledge they get, as well as in the way this information is used in decision making 
(Williams, Davids, & Williams, 1999). 
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Thomas, French and Humphries (1986) defined sport expertise as a complex system of knowledge 
productions about the current situation and about past events, combined with the players’ ability to develop 
the required technical skill. Anderson (1987) proposed two types of knowledge: declarative and procedural. 
Declarative knowledge is the number of adjectives and characteristics we use to refer to an object, event or 
idea. It is the concept we have about something. It is identified as “knowing”, “knowing what”. Procedural 
knowledge is defined as the knowledge about how to act and how to do things (“knowing how”). It is a 
description about how to do something. Procedural knowledge includes the appropriate selection within the 
game context (McPherson & French, 1991). Even though it is important to remark that the definition of 
procedural knowledge is complex because when dealing with motor expertise, as Thomas and Thomas 
(1994) indicate, the knowledge of “how” can be referred, either to the response selection or to its execution, 
that is, “doing it”. On this way, Thomas and Thomas (1994) establishes a subdivision of procedural 
knowledge, differentiating response selection procedures and motor procedures. Chi (1978) adds another 
type of knowledge: strategic knowledge. This refers to the knowledge about rules and general forms of 
performing (Thomas & Thomas, 1994).  
 
Several authors suggested that a base of declarative knowledge is necessary to develop more complex 
structures of procedural knowledge (Anderson, 1976, 1982; Chi & Rees, 1983). Following this line, French 
and Thomas (1987) remark that you must develop a base of declarative knowledge of a sport, before being 
able to develop good skills in decision making in a suitable way.  
 
This way, as a product of experience, subjects may closely relate both types of knowledge, developing their 
motor competence (Ruiz, 1995). An appropriate decision making in different game situations is as 
important as the execution of the motor skills required to perform the decided actions. Those subjects that 
show a minimum declarative knowledge of their sport, show a low quality in their decisions in real game 
situations (French & Thomas, 1987). It is possible that a lot of these mistakes observed in young players of 
different sports, may be the result of a lack of knowledge about what to do in every game situation, that is, 
the lack of procedural knowledge (French & Thomas, 1987; Thomas & Thomas, 1994). 
 
Given the connection between procedural knowledge and decision making in sport, Thomas and Thomas 
(1994) point out that the development of this type of knowledge is important and interesting, and it has a 
great improvement capacity potential. But, how can procedural knowledge be developed? How do age and 
expertise increase influence on procedural knowledge? Specific studies suggest two approaches (French & 
McPherson, 1999). Firstly: a determined quantity of declarative knowledge goes before knowledge within a 
specific area (Anderson, 1982; Chi, 1981; Chi & Rees, 1983), as for example, sport. Declarative knowledge 
is represented by a number of conditions related to different action options and later related to concrete 
actions (McPherson & Thomas, 1989). Secondly: having into account that the development of procedural 
knowledge  needs a wide amount of time and practice, there aren’t at this moment any direct instrument 
that let us measure the influence of the factors related to the development of this type of knowledge. 
Perhaps, the development of procedural knowledge may follow these lines (Thomas & Thomas, 1994): 
direct instruction (cognitive) about “what” and “how”, deductions during the game and observation, trial and 
error during the game. 
 
Cross-curricular studies have proved that expert players differ from novices in declarative, procedural, 
conditional and strategic knowledge (Abernethy et al., 1993; Glaser & Chi, 1988; McPherson, 1994). 
Experts have a wider interrelation among the different types of knowledge, structured into a more 
hierarchical way and, consequently, an easier access to it (Glaser & Chi, 1988; Sternberg & Horvath, 
1995). Experts are faster, better, and they have a more automatic cognitive processing. They are able to 
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give more appropriate and creative solutions to the problems in a game (Sternberg & Horvath, 1995). 
Experts have a more abstract representation of game problems, they use different production systems to 
solve them, and they pay attention to the deep characteristics of the problem. On the other hand, novices 
respond according to the surface characteristics of that problem (Abernethy et al., 1993; Sternberg & 
Horvath, 1995). 
 
A novice placer gets into an expert when he develops in a deeper way his specific procedures (French & 
Thomas, 1987; McPherson, 1999a, 1999b, 2000; McPherson & Kernodle, 2003, 2007; McPherson & 
Thomas, 1989). Players evolve from prosecuting general objectives (i.e.: fast shoot to the basket) to the 
planning of more specific objectives (i.e.: feinting to get the ball in a comfortable position and shooting 
without any opposition). McPherson and Thomas (1989) suggest that novice players make a general 
approach to the problem because they are still developing their declarative knowledge and skills. Expert 
tennis players of this study showed in the verbal protocols that, in all cases and when compared with 
novices: a higher level in concepts, more conditions, more actions, greater flexibility in decision making, 
faster decision making and greater interconnection of concepts. 
 
Anderson’s theory 
 
There are several theories trying to explain how a high level of knowledge is acquired by experts and how 
they use it in sport. One of the most popular is the Active Control of Thought model (ACT) developed by 
Anderson (1982, 1983, 1987). From now on some outlines of this theory are going to be developed, 
departing from the Williams et al. compiling (1999). 
 
Anderson (1983) suggests that human cognition is based upon a series of condition-action connections 
named productions. These productions are responsible of doing suitable actions under specific conditions. 
A production is what McPherson and Thomas (1989) named as propositions or conditional statements of 
the type “IF…, THEN…” between the specific conditions of the context and the execution of the suitable 
action in that situation. 
 
A production system is composed out of three different types of memory: declarative, procedural and 
working. Declarative memory is the information about “what to do”, while procedural memory has the 
knowledge about “how to do” something. On this way, the importance of declarative and procedural 
knowledge is pointed out in sport performance. Working memory has updated information about the 
accessible systems. This is information, as well as that recovered by the long term declarative memory and 
that eventual information are stored up by coding processes and production actions. 
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Figure 1. Model of the ACT system of production, represented departing from its main components and 
interrelation processes (Anderson, 1983) 
 
In Anderson’s theory, represented in Figure 1, we can identify several processes. As indicated at the 
bottom of figure 1, the subject has two ways to connect with the outer world. Coding processes let him to 
put sensory information about the environment into the working memory, while acting processes change 
these commands, by means of the working memory, into behaviours or actions. On the same way, the 
working memory is linked to the declarative memory by means of recovering and storing processes. Storing 
processes are used to create new and permanent registers or files with contents belonging to the working 
memory and to increase the reinforcement of the already stored registers into the declarative memory. 
Recovering processes recover information from the declarative memory. Matching processes, represented 
on the right side of the figure, inform to the production memory about the conditions presented on the 
working memory. Execution processes transfer the appropriate procedure required as a response to the 
declarative memory. All this production process by matching and executing is called application. According 
to Anderson, this process of application shows that the new procedures are learnt by the result of the 
already existent productions. The result of the performed action as a response informs the executor about if 
it was suitable or not. In this sense, the executor “learns by doing”. 
 
An important aspect of this theory is that expertise is developed by means of control transition, by means of 
declarative knowledge, towards procedural knowledge control. Anderson (1983) remarks that, initially, all 
knowledge is coded in a declarative way. You can have access to these declarative codifications, step by 
step, by a process of limited capacity and under a conscious control (for example, by means of verbal 
propositions). Consequently, the actions performance requires the working memory to keep the 
components tasks and their interrelations. By means of practice, the production system develops the 
replacement of the interpretation of the application process by behaviour procedures in a direct way, 
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unconsciously. The production system represents procedures of specific tasks in the long term memory, 
which is activated without needing knowledge about the processes to recover in the working memory. This 
means a decrease in the number of the production rules required to complete the task. 
 
Declarative knowledge is transferred to procedural knowledge by means of processes of storing 
knowledge. This is a gradual process where some errors in procedural information happen, which will be 
corrected with practice. Knowledge compilation has two subprocesses of composition and development of 
procedures (proceduralisation). The composition process is the combination of sequences of production in 
unique procedures, which are also stored. This accelerates the process of knowledge compilation, creating 
new operators that have the sequences of steps used in a particular problem. The process of procedures 
development deletes data about production conditions that require the matching from the long term 
memory by means of the working memory. That is, it builds versions of productions that don’t need 
declarative information that has to be recovered from the working memory. The declarative knowledge 
required is built under a production rule. This supposes a significant advantage for experts, because it 
implies an increase of the available capacity in the working memory for other functions related to activity 
(Allard & Burnett, 1985). 
 
Once a production set is created, this is accurated by means of generalisation, discrimination and 
reinforcement subprocesses. The generalisation subprocess is the development of more flexible 
productions that may be applied in different situations. Discrimination processes limit the use of a 
production only in those situations that were previously successful. Reinforcement processes refer to the 
improvement of the production rule by means of repeating the application, which means that the application 
time decreases. This process lets the better rules to be reinforced and the worse to be weakened. Finally, 
the selection of a production rule in a situation is determined by the competition among the different 
production rules. These rules compete for the activation of the necessary elements for matching. The result 
of this competition will be strong production, selected among other weaker productions.  The successful 
development of these production systems shows us the important role of “proceduralisation” in expert 
performance. For this reason, from a practical point of view, the study of the most efficient means to 
develop these production systems in sport is highly relevant.  
 
Anderson (1983) suggests that the new productions are learnt from the study of the result of the already 
existent production. By doing a task the acquisition and keeping of declarative knowledge is promoted. It is 
important to remark that in the ACT theory, the actions refer to the cognitive actions more than to the motor 
actions. Consequently, “the performance of a task” is only related to the component of response selection. 
Furthermore, the strict application of the ACT theory to the study of expertise in sport will be incomplete 
because “the performance of a task” in sport may refer to both the selection of a movement or the 
execution of a movement (Abernethy et al., 1993; McPherson, 1994). 
 
Finding the relationship between “knowing” and “doing” is a controversial matter among researchers of 
expertise development in sport. Parker (1989) studied how to determine if the improvement of declarative 
knowledge of experts is in fact a component of skill or the product of experience and of task exposure. For 
this study, groups of hockey players, trainers and spectators were required to classify pictures of game 
phases into conceptual categories (i.e.: counterattacks, defensive strategies, tactical resources, etc). The 
achieved results showed that spectators were less skilful to identify the predominant game in each pictures, 
being differences among groups in the pictures categorisation. Expert players and trainers were able to use 
their current knowledge, developed through game, to interpret what they were watching in those pictures, 
while novel subjects who saw a great amount of hockey games with a limited game experience , made their 
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choices only by means of the basic information shown in the pictures. The conclusion is that declarative 
knowledge is an element of skill more than a result of the time devoted to a particular domain. That is, 
“knowing” helps “doing”. 
 
Allard and Starkes (1991) suggest that if “knowing” and “doing” are related, this connection should also be 
produced on the other way round. That is “doing” should also help “knowing”. Williams and Davids (1995) 
analysed the importance of the “doing-knowing” connection within the declarative knowledge in football. In 
that study expert players and physically handicapped spectators participated. They did specific tests on 
football about remembering, recognition and anticipation. Expert players had an average of six hundred 
and fifty competition games and they had watched at least fifty, while expert spectators had watched an 
average of six hundred games and they had never played football. The hypothesis was that expert football 
players should show a higher knowledge because “doing” helps “knowing”. Expert football players showed 
a better remembering, recognising and anticipation than the group of physical handicapped. The main 
difference between both groups was that the physical handicapped had only acquired experience by being 
spectators, while the football players got their experience by means of execution. In other words, the 
subjects were compared according to their football experience, but achieved in a different way. These 
findings suggest that “knowing” and “doing” are related, but not only “knowing” influences “doing”. “Doing” 
also helps “knowing”.  
 
However, Allard and Starkes (1991) suggest that “knowing” and “doing” aren’t directly related by means of 
the “IF…, THEN...” statements. They point out that “knowing” and “doing” may be influenced in an 
independent way. Experts not only have a wide declarative and procedural knowledge, they also have 
better connections between this stored knowledge. These authors suggest that “it is the flexibility of the 
connection, more than the establishment of stable connections, what is vital for a successful motor 
performance” (Allard & Starkes, 1991). 
 
CONTRIBUTION OF KNOWLEDGE, TECHNICAL SKILL AND EXPERIENCE 
 
Skill and performance in game are frequently used as synonyms. However, when it is necessary to do 
research it is possible to remark the division of the term “performance in game” into cognitive components 
and technical or skills components. Knowledge and decision making are included as cognitive components, 
while motor execution or the capacity to do sport skills (i.e.: bouncing, passing or shooting) is similar to the 
word skill (Thomas & Thomas, 1994). The hypothesis is that expertise is additive and game performance 
may be divided into an easy mathematical operation in which the addition of knowledge and skill equals 
expertise. However, it is probable that expertise could be something else than a group of components 
(Thomas & Thomas, 1994). 
 
But, how do age, expertise about development of knowledge and experience influence sport? Experience is 
usually lineal to age (but not necessarily), and in an analogous way practice, performance and competition. 
Both knowledge and skill increase as a result of an increase of practice and competition. The idea is that 
experience is something else than knowledge acquisition and skill acquired by practice. In fact, experience 
should be the interaction of knowledge, skill and psychological variables. Those subjects that begin in sport 
practice have a reduced level of game knowledge, and usually a low level of skill. The development of 
technical skills is slowly developed by means of a great amount of practice. Usually, knowledge is improved 
in a faster way than skill (French & Thomas, 1987), and both increase with experience since childhood to 
adolescence.  
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Execution of technical skills 
 
Technical skills have both a qualitative and quantitative evaluation. The processes of qualitative evaluation 
try to evaluate the way in which a skill execution is performed. Quantitative evaluation deals with measuring 
the final result (i.e.: time, distance). There are two important aspects that have to be taken into account 
when using skill tests. We are referring to the instrument’s validity (Abernethy et al., 1993; Johnson & 
Nelson, 1986; Thomas & Nelson, 1990) and to its suitability to the age of the studied groups. 
 
French and Thomas (1987) measured bouncing and shooting at the beginning and at the end of a 
basketball season in young players with two different levels of performance, and they made initial 
comparisons. Expert players were significantly better in shots than the less expert players, despite of their 
age. Some young players showed higher levels of skill than others older than them. In the case of 
bouncing, experts had higher marks than novices, but not in a significant way. The fact that the best players 
have higher levels of skill is not a surprising finding, but the fact that older players (aged eleven and twelve) 
don’t have higher levels of skill than the youngest (aged eight, nine and ten) is remarkable. Basketball 
players played in the same league and the teams had both experts and novices, all of them belonging to 
the same age rank. Individual differences and expertise may explain this variability. 
 
There were similar results in a study about baseball players (Nevett, French, Spurgeon, Rink, & Graham, 
1993). Age and performance level were significant variables for shooting distance and accuracy. 
 
Another surprising fact found in the French and Thomas (1987) study was that shooting and bouncing skills 
didn’t improve along the season in the case of the younger players. In this case practice didn’t bring about 
an improvement on these variables. Tinberg (1993) studied basketball with players in their fourth and 
seventh year, remarking the content in their training sessions. Seventh grade players made an average of 
fifteen shoots per session, independently of their skill level. On the other hand, it could be observed that the 
best players in fourth grade made an average of thirteen shots per training session, while the worst players 
made an average of ten shots. If we compare these results with the average results in shot of professional 
players (about three hundred a day, without including real game), we can face one of the causes that 
creates performance differences in both experts and novices. But we cannot state that practice by itself 
could grant skill development (Thomas & Thomas, 1994). 
 
Knowledge and decision making 
 
As pointed before, knowledge is usually categorised into declarative, procedural and strategic (Chi, 1981; 
French & Thomas, 1987; McPherson & Thomas, 1989; Thomas, Thomas, & Gallagher, 1993). The link 
between a situation and an action is called procedure, being able to differentiate between motor procedure 
(movement execution) and response selection (the movement to execute in a given situation) (Thomas & 
Thomas, 1994). 
 
Response selection is more important in open or high strategy sports, in which an interaction attack-
defense appears and in those sports where there is a high demand of constant changes. Knowledge is 
acquired as a result of instruction and practice. Within a range of cognitive working, knowledge must be 
perceived as equally reachable by all subjects. 
 
McPherson (1994) proposed that in the process of expertise development, the subject’s knowledge may 
develop a number of transformations: 
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− Action plans based on different goal levels, without a hierarchical goal structure, are substituted by 
conditions and actions that act as decision rules. 
− Weak or inappropriate conditions and actions turn into tactical, refined and associated conditions 
and actions. 
− Global approximations to sport situations, with a minimum processing of relevant elements in the 
task, are replaced by more tactical approximations with relevant information (both of past and 
present events) 
− The processing of environmental events or surface characteristics is replaced by the processing of 
information in depth, with more tactical levels. 
− The monitoring and planning processes are replaced by specialized controls and higher planning 
processes (mostly based on conditions) 
− Limited actions without specialized processing are replaced by tactical actions including 
specialized processes, with the aim of remarking or modifying actions. 
 
Decision making may be evaluated by its accuracy level and speed. Accuracy, understood as the 
appropiateness-unapropriateness of doing an action in a precise moment, and understood as knowledge, 
may depend on instruction and practice. Additionally, speed should increase with expertise, but practice 
doesn’t grant a fast decision making (Thomas & Thomas, 1994). Speed in decision making is basic in some 
sports. There is a traditional belief which says that decisions (response selection) are based on concepts 
(declarative knowledge) and the more concepts a subject has, the more elaborated procedures (procedural 
knowledge) will be able to develop. This lets him have an accurate decision making. Although this 
hypothesis about declarative knowledge is the basis of procedural knowledge has been questioned (Allard, 
Deakin, Parker, & Rodgers, 1993). In open or high strategy sports, players have to learn individual skill 
techniques as well as different combinations of skills. This learning process of technical skills is probably 
similar to the low strategy sports. However, in high strategy sports, players have also to learn to change the 
roles given by the attack-defence interaction. Consequently, response selection and decision making must 
be learnt in high strategy sports (Thomas & Thomas, 1994). For young players, knowledge is probably the 
most relevant factor in game (Abernethy et al., 1993). Knowing what to do is a basic element in young 
players (French & Thomas, 1987). The problem is how to be able to teach procedures in a short time 
(Thomas & Thomas, 1994). 
 
KNOWLEDGE DEVELOPMENT, TECHNICAL SKILL AND PERFORMANCE IN GAME 
 
The fact that the older and more experienced subjects in sport get a greater game performance has been 
suggested by a big number of researches. But, the way these changes happen and their nature might be a 
more complex problem (Thomas et al., 2001). French and Thomas (1987) and McPherson and Thomas 
(1989) showed that knowledge in basketball and tennis (declarative and procedural), skills and 
performance for young experts (aged between eight and eleven) were not only better than novices of the 
same age but even better than older novices (aged eleven to thirteen). 
 
Later researches, as the one done by French, Spurgeon and Nevett (1995) found out that the execution of 
technical skills in baseball during the game discriminated among different expertise levels. French, Nevett, 
Spurgeon, Graham, Rink and McPherson (1996), y Nevett and French (1997) related the practice level in a 
specific task with response selection in baseball competition. Young expert players showed a higher level 
of representation in game situations than novices of the same age, but a lower level than older players and 
“High School” players. French et al. (1996) also pointed that young players had less practice opportunities 
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during the game (i.e.: they played in the further spaces in the game field) and less game time than older 
players. Experience and maturity were taken as possible explanations of these findings.   
 
McPherson (1999a) examined technical skills in tennis and problem representation during individual 
competitions with experts and novices aged ten and twelve, and with adults. The players’ competition level, 
apart from their age, influenced in the task’s performance. Despite of age, experts were able to make 
forceful shots during competition and to supervise successfully their actions to develop solutions or to 
modify. Behavioural data showed that experts made similar percentages in sophisticated response 
selection. However, data from interviews show that adults’ responses were more sophisticated than those 
of the younger experts. Young experts have less tactical plans of action, they use less strategic supports 
and they have less support on context evaluation. Expert adults use their cognitive flexibility in their 
approaches to game situations. Adult players differ from young players, without taking into account their 
expertise level, because they use more regulatory strategies (output supervision) than the young players. 
This is why it is possible that adults use more general approximations to solve game problems. Despite of 
age, novices didn’t use “IF…,THEN…” statements to execute technical skills in games, suggesting that 
these subjects were beginning to learn basic concepts of tennis competition, before focusing on skill 
learning (Thomas, Gallagher, & Thomas, 2001). 
 
LINKS AMONG KNOWLEDGE, TECHNICAL SKILL AND GAME PERFORMANCE 
 
French and Thomas (1987), and McPherson and Thomas (1989) found out significant links among 
knowledge and skill as a component and game performance as another component. In both cases the 
canonical correlation was 0.70. In the case of the basketball study, knowledge and skills (shooting and 
bouncing) were significantly related to game performance (decision making and execution). In the case of 
tennis, there were also found significant links between knowledge and skill, and game performance 
(decision making and execution). Consequently, it is possible to say that links between knowledge, skill and 
game performance have been consistent in the studies about these two sports with subjects aged from 
eight to thirteen. French and Thomas (1987) studied young basketball players (experts and novices) during 
a season, measuring knowledge, skill and game performance at the beginning and at the end of the 
season. Only basketball knowledge improved along the season; skill didn’t improve. The only measure of 
game performance that improved along the season was decision making. At the end of the season, 
knowledge and decision making were the only variables that correlated in a significant way. As a 
consequence, cognitive components of performance (knowledge about basketball and decision making 
during the game) seem to improve before skill components (bouncing, shooting and executing). French and 
Thomas (1987) suggest that these results may be caused by the emphasis of trainers when developing 
cognitive aspects, taking apart skill aspects. 
 
Young players participating in the French and Thomas (1987) studies and McPherson and Thomas (1989) 
were interviewed to value their procedural knowledge on basketball or tennis. Verbalisations of interviews 
were coded according to a specific criterion of analysis. Results suggested that experts had a greater and 
more complex knowledge, more organised than novices in basketball or tennis. The idea that procedural 
knowledge is more developed in experts is based on the greater and more varied use of “IF…,THEN…” 
statements in both sports, and the lack of its use on the part of the novices. McPherson and Thomas (1989) 
have given empiric support to this idea that says that experts develop “IF…, THEN…” productions. This 
study stated that the expertise level is the really important thing in the link between “the selection of an 
action” and “the execution of that action”. Young experts disagreed between their skill to select an action 
and its execution when compared with novices. This happened because young experts made a more 
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complex action selection which is more difficult to execute. Older experts didn’t disagree so much between 
the selected actions and their execution when compared with young experts, proving that the level of 
expertise increases with practice and experience. So, we could think that the successful incorporation of 
the part dealing with “execution” within the simple statements “IF…, THEN…” is the real distinctive of 
expertise. That is, a higher expertise level is originated from a great number of agreements between 
“conditions / action selection” and “execution” (Thomas et al., 2001). 
 
The role of experience, understood as a specific practice, has been examined in experts as well as in 
expertise development. Practice itself doesn’t grant expertise. For example, dancers who had a similar 
experience and practice showed remarkably different expertise levels (Starkes, Deakin, Lindley, & Crisp, 
1987). The proposed hypothesis is that quality practice is a factor that may facilitate expertise development 
(Ericsson & Charness, 1994; Helsen, Starkes, & Hodges, 1998). Although ten thousand hours of practice 
may be the breaking point in practice quantity to become an expert (Ericsson, 1996), describing the crucial 
components of quality is even more complex (Thomas et al., 2001), being that a question that has to be 
solved by research (Baker & Davids, 2007). 
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